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. ABSTRACT
Ultranationalist and religious fundamentalist movements frequently
use hate to mobilize people. These groups possess a sophisticated under-
standing of the importance of appealing to the emotions. Leaders often
employ xenophobic language intended to inspire fear and justify a defen-
sive reaction. The movements also rely heavily upon symbols, myths,
and public events to simplify and communicate the "truths" of their ideol-
ogies. The leaders convey messages with tremendous affective appeal.
Yet, measures exist to counter and contain the politics of hate. The
development of civil society, group rights, a free media, and integrated
institutions can contribute to a durable solution in cases of ethnic or relig-
ious conflict. Finally, the option of humanitarian intervention exists
when the politics of hate leads to extremist violence.
I. NATIONALISM, RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM,
AND THE POLITICS OF HATE
Nationalist and ethno-religious conflicts continue to influence domes-
tic and global politics. Intemational and non-governmental organizations
appear impotent against seemingly primal struggles. The politics of blood,
tribes, terror, and God dominate as the promise of post-Cold War peace and
development recedes. In the midst of genocide and terrorism, our belief
that we had learned a lasting lesson from the Holocaust seems sorely mis-
taken. The atrocities and death counts of Rwanda, Congo, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Sudan blur while nationalism and relig-
ious fundamentalism perpetuate the politics of hate.
Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" contends that violent
national conflicts are inevitable, particularly at the junction of cultures in
the Middle East and Balkans (1993). Ignatieffs Blood and Belonging
acknowledges tension between ethnic groups, but posits that some minori-
ties are justified in their struggles. He perceives political and economic
oppression to be a fundamental source of ethnic conflict (1993). Ander-
son's seminal work on nations as imagined communities highlights the
view that nations are constructed (1991). Hobsbawm also argues that
nations are constructed and therefore can change, but only slowly given the
dense web of relationships upon which ethnic identity is built (1990). This
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perspective further suggests that national leaders maintain allegiance by
creating ethnic traditions and identifying threatening enemies (Djilas 1995;
Pesic 1994; Davison and Tesan 2006). Gellner and Smith each examine
nationalism as an ideology with a program (1983, 1; 1983, 171). The polit-
ics of hate as part of the program becomes necessary to demonize and dehu-
manize the other as the enemy (Volkan 1994, 120-22). Similarly, Appleby,
Eickelman, and Juergensmeyer each demonstrate how fundamentalist lead-
ers employ modern technology and media to agitate and mobilize their
social base (1994, 36-37; 2002; 2003, 141-47). Fundamentalist groups
deliver images via television, the internet, and cellphones which highlight
the enemies' profanity against the sacred world they strive to defend.
Yet such conflict is not inevitable. Nationalist and religiously inspired
tensions have been quelled in situations as diverse as those in Northern
Ireland, Macedonia, and Malaysia. The challenge is to understand and
implement the conditions and processes necessary to counter the hate and
conflicts which nationalism and fundamentalism can promote (Harff and
Gurr 2004, 181-90). Indeed, not all nationalisms seek to generate hate, but
those that do often act systematically and employ sophisticated techniques.
Charismatic leaders seek to solidify support with pleas for unity and vigi-
lance. They sometimes exaggerate or fabricate claims about the threatening
tactics and dangerous plans of the political opposition. Likewise, some fun-
damentalist groups justify militant conflict as an essential defense against
evil enemies. Thus the politics of hate develops by stealth and then spirals
as popular fears lead to conflict. Nationalist and fundamentalist supporters
embrace violence spurred by ignorance and insecurity. Still, such violent
conflicts are neither primal nor inevitable. Political alternatives and reme-
dies do exist to preclude or ameliorate the implementation of the politics of
hate and its violent consequences. Policy-makers and conflict mediators
can learn from the resolution of other cases (Lake and Rothchild 1998, 7-
22, 203-26). Religious and nationalist leaders can promote their political
preferences without communicating messages of hate.
II. NATIONALISM: THE IDEOLOGY AND ITS APPEAL
Contemporary nationalisms attract followers because they provide
people with identity. Nationalism's sense of belonging offers comfort to
individuals confronting alienation associated with migration, globalization
or secularization (Nassar 2005, 3-15; Kaldor 1996, 43). The potency and
appeal of nationalism is linked to its certainty and consolation. Nationalism
asserts various rights as uncontestable facts. Typically these rights include
cultural autonomy and self-determination. Often these rights also extend to
claims on specific historical lands. Proponents of the nationalist cause dis-
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regard the fact that these assumptions are debatable (Ignatieff 1996, 217-
22). Likewise they overlook the mythical character of the very history of
the nation-whether that origin extends to Romulus and Remus or to the
Serbian Battle of the Field of Blackbirds or to the Promised Land of a
sacred text.
Nationalism is a group's awareness and embrace of its identity as a
nation, and its desire to enhance its existence and power. Nationalism, as
an ideology, is more than mere patriotism or nationalist sentiment. Nation-
alism calls for the supreme loyalty of its members to the nation. A nation is
a people who believe they belong together because they share race, history,
religion, culture, or language. A nation is different from a state. A state is
an intemational juridical entity which effectively occupies a territory and
governs a population. It is possible that a nation may occupy a state, or
desire statehood. Indeed, statehood frequently is the goal of nations. It also
is possible that a nation exists on a regional or global level and includes
people from multiple states. This is the case with the Islamic nation. It also
is true of the Kurdish nation.
Nationalism is a powerful concept because of its emotional content.
Nationalist leaders appeal to potential supporters on behalf of their ances-
tors and grandchildren. They assert that members can neither ignore the
contributions and sacrifices of the past, nor abandon the rights of future
generations (Volkan 1996). Nationalism often is an appeal made to the
weak and insecure. In the twenty-first century, nationalism attracts people
who feel oppressed by political or economic forces (Michnik 1996, 18;
Fijalkowski 1996). It offers a sense of identity to those who feel victim-
ized. This includes both the young German encountering guest workers and
the Iraqi responding to American forces. The potency of the nationalist
appeal is evident among generations of Palestinians born and raised in refu-
gee camps who still seek the right to return. Under these conditions, people
lack citizenship's identity and rights, and seek to expel occupation forces
from their historical lands. The fact that Palestinian victimization raged
against Israelis but not against the Jordanians and Egyptians highlights the
subjective element of nationalism. Similarly, refugees who must remain in
camps tend to construct and reinforce histories of injustice, while refugees
who resettle and integrate into new environments tend to identify with the
new situation. This is vividly apparent in the differences in attitudes held
by Burundian Hutus toward Tutsis. Hutu refugees who found jobs and
assimilated into Tanzanian society after the 1972 massacre de-emphasized
their status and Tutsi abuses. In contrast, Hutus who remained isolated in
refugee camps in Tanzania emphasized their collective identity and the
atrocities they suffered. They spent the days and years in the refugee camps
inculcating a nationalist identity among their youth, demonizing the Tutsi
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enemy, and planning a retaliatory attack (Malkki 1990). Thus, nationalism
appeals to the colonized, oppressed, threatened, and displaced. It often res-
onates with people who do not have control over their political lives (Nas-
sar 2005). This is evident among the Kurds, the most populous state-less
people, now spread across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran (Ignatieff 1993,
178-212).
Nationalism also appeals to groups that feel under siege or in decline.
It was attractive to Germans overwhelmed by the humiliation of World War
I, the Versailles Peace, and the Depression. It became a tool of many Afri-
can post-colonial leaders who realized that they had to engage in nation
building in order to avoid implosion after achieving independence. To this
extent, it is understandable that African post-colonial nationalism initially
was anti-Western. Nationalism often originates as an ideology of indepen-
dence and then matures to one of national consciousness. African leaders
tried to appeal beyond ethnic and class differences within their new states
(Young 1986).
Many current nationalist movements develop among ethnic groups or
indigenous peoples who oppose both the government and its perceived for-
eign allies. Sometimes the target is foreign investment and business people.
The sabotage of western oil pipelines in Nigeria and Colombia serves as an
example. Likewise, the Tamil Tigers often bomb banks and businesses of
the "foreign" Sinhalese, including the Sri Lankan Central Bank and World
Trade Center. Other groups' targets include Western transnational and
international governmental organizations. Most dramatically, insurgents
bombed the UN headquarters in Iraq. Thus, the assumption that Western-
ization is progress is firmly rejected as the Western presence is portrayed as
detrimental and the virtues of a nationalist agenda extolled.
Nationalisms often identify an enemy and warn of the need for vigi-
lance. The enemy's threat first compels national unity; then, in an interac-
tive process, national unity and identity enflame xenophobia (Fijalkowski
1996; Kaldor 1996; Schopflin 1996). Young explains how ethnic tensions
develop in African cities where ethnicities mingle and competition for
resources is intense (1982, 89). In rural regions, ethnic groups tend to be
isolated, but migration to urban areas brings political, economic, and social
confrontation. People then seek comfort within their familiar group. Igna-
tieff also highlights how nationalism offers comfort in the midst of modern-
ization and detachment from traditional community (1996, 223). The same
process sometimes affects Muslims in the Global South. Urbanization dis-
locates people, while globalization highlights their poverty. Dictatorship
and political oppression frequently compound the sense of despair even
among the educated and middle classes. Islamic fundamentalism offers
familiarity, identity, a sense of power, and a socio-economic support sys-
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tem. Militant fundamentalism often includes promises and emotional
appeals not offered by moderate Muslims (Esposito 1997; Dalacoura 1998,
193-98; Sisk 2000; Ibrahim 2003; United States Institute of Peace 2002).
Islamic fundamentalism also may target the foreign and modem as evil and
dangerous (Nassar 2005, 6-7). Accordingly, extremists bomb tourists in
Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, and Bali.
Sometimes nationalism supports violence or revolution. The national-
ist revolution promises freedom and independence, and permits the group to
fulfill its identity. The leaders justify the violence of the revolution as
heroic and sacrificial, and highlight the glory of post-revolutionary society
with songs, parades, and wall murals. Violence is permissible because the
oppression is unjustifiable. It is foreign and unrepresentative of the nation.
Revolution is necessary because the oppressor otherwise has no reason to
abandon its political and economic exploitation of the people. In this light,
Sinn Eein leader Gerry Adams asserts that the IRA tactic of armed struggle
proved successful and forced the current political process.
Thus, nationalism begins with the assumption of a unique, if not supe-
rior, group that must pursue its power to preserve its identity. The appeal to
individuals is tremendous. It provides identity to individuals, often the
weak who are either oppressed or dislocated. It should be understood that
these individuals are not exclusively the uneducated or poor, but rather
include the middle class and educated who in some situations are nonethe-
less voiceless. For example, Esposito argues that the Islamist appeal
attracts the educated, even the Western educated, because professional
organizations are banned in much of the Middle East (Esposito 1997, 70).
Islamic organizations, like various nationalist groups, offer vehicles for dis-
cussion and participation. Individuals find not only belonging, but also
comfort in the fact that they are valued. Nationalist movements tend to
emphasize the membership's character as unique, special, and strong.
Eijalkowski discusses the xenophobic reaction of middle and working class
Germans to the "anomie that accompanies rapid social change" (1996, 144).
Nationalism typically extols ethnic cleansing or self-determination as
the answer. It is claimed that the problems of the groups and its members
will be overcome with political control. Economic and social problems will
become manageable and resolvable under the nation's leadership. The
immediate goals are to build the nation and expand its power. Individual
political leaders seeking to justify the consolidation or expansion of per-
sonal power further manipulate nationalism (Pesic 1994, 133-34).
Milosevic continuously employed the images of the promise of Serbian
greatness and the threat of Serbian defeat to rally the people and to justify
his concentration and use of power. Croats, Muslims, and Albanians were
threats to the Serbian nation.
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Nationalism can overlap other identities. Sinn Fein tends to be Catho-
lic and lower class, while the Unionists are Protestant and middle class.
Such an overlap transforms the nationalist tensions into an ethno-religious
conflict and further complicates resolution. Hutus were lower class and felt
long suppressed by Tutsis. The African Christians of southern Sudan reject
northern Arab Islamic laws and practices. The overlapping identities rein-
force loyalties, contribute to the intensity of nationalist conflicts, and exac-
erbate efforts to resolve claims. Clearly, nationalism is a potent ideology.
It is a keen tool for those wishing to mobilize populations. Both India and
Pakistan have employed it in their dispute over Kashmir. Additionally,
each deems acquisition of nuclear weapons linked to national prestige and
power.
III. VIRULENT VARIETIES: ULTRANATIONALISM,
NEO-NAZISM, AND NEO-FASCISM
Nationalism offers identity and demands loyalty, but ultranationalism
subordinates all other claims for loyalty and allegiance. This explains why
a Serbian nationalist could kill a Bosniak relative. Loyalty to the nation
transcends loyalty to the family. Likewise, this notion explains the commit-
ment of Tamil Tiger nationahsts to engage in suicide missions. Ultrana-
tionalist loyalty demands the willingness to sacrifice the self. Indeed, the
extremist nationalist claim not only is understood as supreme, but also is
presented as urgent. Ultranationalist groups often perceive threats to their
existence and argue that they must engage in preventive measures, such as
ethnic cleansing or deportation, to counter these dangers. Both the radical
Hutu and Serb leaderships asserted such claims. In these cases, unques-
tioned dedication to the group is essential for both the group's and the indi-
vidual's survival.
Ultranationalist parties exist today throughout Europe. These right-
wing movements have followers in both the post-industrial developed states
of Western Europe and the democratizing states of the former Soviet bloc.
The fact that support for these parties exists in states as diverse as Austria,
France, Germany, Norway, and Russia suggests that there are multiple fac-
tors contributing to their attractiveness. In France, the strength of the right
primarily is a response to the growing population of foreign workers, partic-
ularly from northern Africa. Haider's popularity in Austria is attributable to
his personal charisma as well as to concerns about the alienating effects of
European unification. Many west European youth are attracted to extremist
groups because they offer a justification for rebellion against established
institutions (Fraser 2000, 55-88; Fijalkowski 1996, 144). In contrast, the
growth of extremist movements in Russia is different. The mass appeal of
2006/07] POLITICS OF HATE 43
ultranationalism in the former Soviet Union cannot be understood as a reac-
tion to the failure of democracy, because democracy has yet to be
embraced. Rather, nationalist movements and policies are perceived as a
way to control the instability associated with the transition from commu-
nism. Additionally, these movements contribute to a sense of national iden-
tity and greatness during a time of confusion and humiliation (Nodia 1996,
108-16).
Most contemporary European ultranationalists do not assert the essen-
tiality of force and war. Violence seems unjustifiable because democracy
provides European groups the freedom to make their claims in the political
arena. Accordingly, there is a distinction between extremist nationalist
movements, such as Le Pen's in France, which vociferously advocate law
and order and immigration controls, and atomized skinheads who embrace
violence as a legitimate response to non-whites and foreigners. Further-
more, even most ultranationalists support a democratic albeit authoritarian
state. They are not as extreme as neo-Nazis and fascists who embrace dic-
tatorship. The unifying principle then seems to be that ultranationalist
movements perceive the nation not only as a living and precious entity that
advances individual and collective well-being, but also as an entity superior
to others which demands protection and attention.
Neo-Nazism and neo-fascism are particularly troubling variants of
ultranationalism. Whereas other nationalisms claim uniqueness, neo-
Nazism and neo-fascism assert superiority. Many nationalist groups fight
for immigration controls, autonomy, or self-determination, but a will to
power drives neo-Nazis and neo-fascists. The neo-Nazis and fascists
embrace violence as necessary for the security and expansion of the nation
and the progress of culture and civilization (Mussolini 1939). Additionally,
the social Darwinist beliefs of neo-Nazis justify dictatorship. Just as the
Aryan nation asserts superiority over all other groups, so too, within the
Aryan nation certain individuals are superior and ought to lead (Hitler
1926).
The skinhead culture in developed countries is particularly troubling to
some politicians because of its embrace of neo-Nazi slogans, symbols, and
causes. Skinheads do not fit into the traditional neo-Nazi classification
because they tend to engage in decadent lifestyles that include drugs, hard
rock, and pornography. Indeed, their politics are ambiguous, with some
groups advocating dictatorship and others supporting anarchy. Yet it is the
hate and anti-foreign violence of these groups which is particularly dis-
turbing, not the threat that their presence presents to democracy (Sussman
2000; Fijalkowski 1996, 139-40).
While neo-Nazism exists, it seems insufficiently organized to win
elections or overturn democratic institutions; but the message of hate often
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culminates with attacks on individuals. Neo-Nazis and fascists embrace the
use of force and terror. They reject both the equality of people and the
notion that individuals possess rights inviolable by the state or nation.
What is distinct about these movements is that their members do not hope
to attract significant popular support and win elections. Rather, they often
operate covertly and in small groups, seeking to promote their ideology
through action and publicity. In the United States, many of these groups
also are involved in the Christian Identity movement, which introduces the
fagade of an ethno-religious quality and heightens the emotional appeal and
doctrinal character of the ideology. The internet is a primary tool for com-
munication, recruitment, and propaganda.
It is critical to understand that there is a broad divide between national-
ism, ultranationalism, and neo-Nazism. Nationalists are willing to negoti-
ate, do not always view force as essential, and may be democratic. They
strive to protect their uniqueness. Ultranationalists represent a nationalist
extreme because their supreme loyalty to their nation coupled with an
urgent sense of danger leads them to be less tolerant of the "foreign." Polit-
ical leaders can mobilize ultranationalists because of these tendencies.
Einally, Neo-Nazis accept their superiority and responsibility to purify the
nation. Hate and violence are integral to the movements. Indeed, a related
disturbing trend is the strength of "clerical fascism" as part of the general
growth of religious ideologies and in particular associated with
fundamentalism.
IV. CLERICAL EASCISM AND THE EUNDAMENTALIST APPEAL
Many ethno-religious groups attract attention because of their authori-
tarian practices, totalitarian goals, uncompromising vision, and extreme tac-
tics. Laqueur labels these dangerous religious movements as clerical
fascists (1996, 4, 147). These groups embrace fascist tenets that justify
violence and authoritarianism and reject tolerance and liberal democracy.
They also extol a fundamentalism which rejects compromise and places
conflict in a cosmic arena. Eundamentalists' use of sacred texts and escha-
tological themes validates judgment and conflict in the name of God. The
use of force and violence assumes a purifying and redemptive role for
ethno-religious groups (Juergensmeyer 2003, 164-74).
The resurgence of religion often coincides with popular dislocation
and disaffection. Malay Muslims, for example, emphasize that they have
lived through four ages: European colonization, Japanese occupation, inde-
pendence, and the communal riots (Nash 1991, 699-710). The Taliban
organized in the religious schools which served Afghan refugees in Paki-
stan during the conflict with the Soviet Union (Nojumi 2002, 119-24).
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Religion also interrupts the secularization of politics and privatization of
religion otherwise associated with modernization. For example, as urban-
ization occurs and individuals leave villages and families for work, religion
gains appeal because it offers a mechanism of support in a new and chal-
lenging environment (United States Institute of Peace 2002, 2). Appleby
highlights that the Muslim Brotherhood provides jobs in religious schools
for Egypt's educated, that Hindu fundamentalism attracts India's urban
unemployed, and that Christian fundamentalism comforts Latin America's
slum dwellers (1994, 22-28). In developing countries and emerging regions
where social welfare systems are weak, religious organizations often pro-
vide not only emotional support, but also economic support. Religious
groups run hospitals, schools, soup kitchens, and shelters (Marty and
Appleby 1991, 823-31; Deiros 1991, 155-56; Voll 1991; Appleby 2000,
97). Such groups exist on a spectrum from the Quakers and Mennonites to
Hizbollah and Hamas, but their operations are critical to refugees and peo-
ple in weak states. Sometimes these groups, for example the Mennonites,
are apolitical. In other cases, they will try to influence political and eco-
nomic policy and systems so that the structures which give rise to the pov-
erty and powerlessness of those they serve are forced to change. The
Quakers fall into this category. Religious beliefs provide the foundation for
a world-view and the evaluation of political and economic systems and pol-
icies. Fundamentalists such as Hizbollah and Hamas differ in that they
wish to impose their religious order on all aspects of public and private life.
Fundamentalists accept a literal translation of sacred texts and elevate these
texts above all other teachings and beliefs. Absolute commitment to the
fundamentalist truth nurtures intolerance and rejection of compromise. Fur-
ther, militant fundamentalists raise particular concern because they embrace
the use of force as a means to achieve power and their goals.
Fundamentalists emphasize the religious basis of all life, but it is
social, political, and economic conditions which support the rise of these
ideologies. Fundamentalism appeals to those seeking power, status and/or
revenge. It once was assumed that primarily the rural, less educated, low-
income people swelled the ranks of these groups. Now it is realized that
this is a myopic and simplistic conclusion. Fundamentalism attracts indi-
viduals and groups who are disenchanted by political or economic corrup-
tion or exclusion. Often this includes the unemployed, but well educated
middle and upper classes. In fact, urban believers may embrace their politi-
cal religious beliefs with a greater intensity than rural members because in
urban regions there exists a critical mass of potential members confronting
Westernization. Furthermore, newcomers to urban areas find consolation
from the challenges of dislocation, modernization, and urbanization in their
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beliefs and in interaction with others who share their views (Marty and
Appleby 1991, 823; Sachedina 1991, 442-50; Nash 1991, 730).
Fundamentalism satisfies those who desire the simplicity and status
quo of the past. Familiar rituals and prayers are a source of comfort in
times of globalization. There is a preference for gender stereotypes in
which men work, women stay at home, and homosexuality does not exist
(Juergensmeyer 2003, 202-09). Fundamentalism's traditional foundation
appeals to both men and marginalized majorities who may feel excluded by
policies that respond to the needs of women and minorities. This certainly
is part of the strength of Hindu fundamentalism in India, where educated
Indian middle classes react to affirmative action policies that seek to allevi-
ate historic discrimination against Muslims and lower castes (Appleby
1994, 25-28). Likewise, many Malay Muslims embraced fundamentalism
in their reaction against the successful Chinese minority (Nash 1991). This
phenomenon also explains the strength of the appeal of Ian Paisley to the
working class Unionists in Northern Ireland. Working class Catholics
threaten working class Protestants more than do upper class Protestants.
Finally, it explains the appeal of fundamentalism to the white population in
South Africa during apartheid. Pat Robertson made sense to Afrikaaners
when he said about apartheid,
I think one man, one vote, just unrestricted democracy, would not be
wise. There needs to be some kind of protection for the minority which
the white people represent. . . and they need and have a right to demand
a protection of their rights. (1992)
Thus, the religious fundamentalist program is deemed the only solution to
crises ranging from war and occupation to modernization and seculariza-
tion. These crises produce a sense of injustice and siege that are powerful
vehicles for unity and mobilization (Juergensmeyer 2003, 225-26; Marty
and Appleby 1991, 822-23).
Fundamentalists reap great benefits from the strong emotional content
of their ideologies. The power of the promises of God and an afterlife are
compelling for believers, particularly those who feel disadvantaged or
oppressed in the current system. These promises are critical factors in
mobilizing adherents to action. Fundamentalists typically are committed to
sacred land and locations. They often accept a prescribed dress which func-
tions as a means of identification and unity. The common dress emphasizes
the significance of the religious movement over individuality (Appleby
1994, 16-18).
Additionally, contemporary fundamentalist movements benefit from
their willingness to embrace new technologies and techniques to promote
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their strict traditional values. Eundamentalist groups in the Middle East as
well as America possess well-developed media networks. The internet is a
critical tool whereby these organizations enroll and maintain membership,
and engage in active public relations campaigns (Marty and Appleby 1991,
828-29).
Whether fundamentalist movements become militant seems to be
linked to their ideology and the environment in which they exist. Like sec-
ular ultranationalist groups, it is less likely that fundamentalist movements
will turn to militancy if they are able to operate in open democratic environ-
ments where they have access to a civil society, the media, and the political
arena. Such access will make claims for the necessity of militant violence
less valid. Consequently, most Christian fundamentalist groups in the
United States are very active in the political arena, but do not engage in
violent action (Appleby 1994, 70). It is interesting to note, however, that
while not engaging in militant action, American Christian fundamentalists
sometimes imply support for violent actions consistent with their cause.
Paul Hill, who murdered a doctor who operated an abortion clinic, found
inspiration in the writings of Christian fundamentalists. Likewise, William
Pierce's The Turner Diaries clearly influenced Timothy McVeigh in his
decision to bomb the Eederal Building in Oklahoma City. Pierce, a white
supremacist, situated his racism in a cosmotheism similar to that of the
Christian Identity movement (Juergensmeyer 2003, 27-33). Additionally,
prominent Christian fundamentalist leaders occasionally voice support for
violence, and even contend that God targets perpetrators of evil. Pat Rob-
ertson commented that US operatives should eliminate Venezuelan Presi-
dent Chavez. He also opined that Ariel Sharon's stroke was divine
retribution for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, that God punished Elorida
with hurricanes because of Gay Days at Disney World, and that an apoca-
lyptic disaster might strike Dover, Pennsylvania because the citizens voted
out of office creationist school board members. Jerry Ealwell suggested
God permitted the terrorist attacks of September 11th because of America's
immorality. These comments associate violence with divine authority and
thereby legitimate the actions. Unlike bin Laden, Ealwell does not fight the
holy war, but he seems to imply that 9/11 was indeed part of a holy war.
In these contexts it is possible to understand the conceptualization of
militant fundamentalism as a form of clerical fascism and to appreciate
some of its similarities with neo-Nazism and neo-fascism. The leader of
each movement is a charismatic authoritarian who espouses activism and
militancy in order to reconstitute the world consistent with the ideology's
values. All the ideologies embrace the necessity of the use of force to
achieve a purer, more civilized world and are explicit about the need to
48 JOURNAL OF HATE STUDIES [Vol. 5:37
purge the territory of the enemy. Thus reminiscent of the Aryan drive to
secure superiority, al-Zawahiri explains of the Muslim,
How can [he] possibly [accept humiliation and inferiority] when he
knows that his nation was created to stand at the center of leadership, at
the center of hegemony and rule, at the center of ability and sacrifice?
How can [he] possibly [accept humiliation and inferiority] when he
knows that the [divine] rule is that the entire earth must be subject to the
religion of Allah—not to the East, not to the West—to no ideology and to
no path except for the path of Allah? (2002)
Yet there is a significant difference between militant fundamentalism as
clerical fascism and secular fascism. The secular fascist understands force
as a necessary tool to purge the current world of mediocrity, weakness, and
opposition. Militant fundamentalists conceive of force as a method to
purge sin from the cosmic order, and also to leave this world of sin. Conse-
quently, militant fundamentalists are more inclined to accept the need for
suicide missions than are secular fascists. For the militant fundamentalist,
both the opposition and the faithful are better dead than living in an earthly
world of sin. God's law is truth, so its defenders cannot compromise.
The Lebanese Islamic fundamentalist group Hizbollah organized in
1982 to gain political and economic status for the Shi'ite plurality after
years of exclusion, civil war, and occupation. The organization's roots
were in the Movement of the Deprived (Sachedina 1991, 446). Hizbollah is
best known for its violent opposition to the Israeli and Western occupations
of Lebanon and its effective use of asymmetrical warfare and suicide
attacks to demoralize the Israelis. Hizbollah also maintains an extensive
public relations and media network to promote its cause and glorify its mar-
tyrs. These tactics possess tremendous emotional effectiveness. Indeed,
Hizbollah convinced Hamas of the efficacy of suicide bombings, and
helped them refine the recruitment and preparation of martyrs. Hizbollah
and Hamas also focus upon the problems of corrupt government and weak
economies. The groups provide tangible benefits such as medical care,
housing, and schools. The militant fundamentalists' willingness to under-
take a popular cause heightened the relevance of Islam. As Islamic move-
ments, the groups identify the essential problem as one of power misused
for materialistic ends. They demonize not only Israel, Jews, and the West,
but also secular governments as hypocritical and destructive. These claims
resonate well with the oppressed, alienated, and frustrated. The appeal is
broad because it is familiar and emotive, and because Hizbollah and Hamas
have mastered techniques to deliver their message (Appleby 2000, 25-27,
56-57, 95-101; Legrain 1997). Lasting solutions seem distant, however.
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because commitment to Allah and the Quran eliminates the possibility of
compromise.
V. THE COMMUNICATION OF THE POLITICS OF HATE
The success of ultranationalist, neo-Nazi, and clerical fascist move-
ments depends upon the communication of hate. It is important to note that
some movements are explicit about the need to hate. The late leader of Al
Qaeda in Iraq, al-Zarqawi, proclaimed after a beheading, "God honored us
and so we harvested their heads and tore up their bodies" (2005). For some
fundamentalists, serving God requires hate. Randall Terry, the militant fun-
damentalist leader of Operation Rescue, said, "I want you to let a wave of
hatred wash over you. Yes, hate is good. . . Our goal is a Christian nation.
We have a Biblical duty, we are called by God, to conquer this country"
(1993). Decades earlier. Hitler made clear his hatred of the Jews and tried
to inspire the Germans to act based upon this hatred. In Mein Kampf he
explicitly described his contempt for Jewish people, labeling them "liars,"
"usurers," "parasites," "menaces," and "eternal blood suckers." He wrote:
With Satanic joy in his face, the black-haired Jewish youth lurks in wait
for the unsuspecting girl whom he defiles with his blood, thus stealing
her from her people. With every means he tries to destroy the racial foun-
dations of the people he has set out to subjugate. Just as he himself sys-
tematically ruins women and girls, he does not shrink back from pulling
down the blood barriers for others, even on a large scale. It was and it is
Jews who bring the Negroes into the Rhineland, always with the same
secret thought and clear aim of ruining the hated white race by the neces-
sarily resulting bastardization, throwing it down from its cultural and
political height, and himself rising to be its master. For a racially pure
people which is conscious of its blood can never be enslaved by the Jew.
In this world he will forever be master over bastards and bastards alone.
And so he tries systematically to lower the racial level by a continuous
poisoning of individuals. (Hitler 1926)
It must be recalled that similarly to Hizbollah and Hamas (both of which
won recent fair elections). Hitler gained office through constitutional
means, with the Nazi Party winning a 44% plurality of votes in the 1932
election. Hitler's messages and policies resonated with German supporters
(Brown 1982), as does Islamic fundamentalism with the followers of
Hizbollah and Hamas.
The ability to successfully convey the politics of hate relates to a num-
ber of factors including organizational strength, media control, and emotive
content. Both the Nazis and fascists excelled at organization, mass mobili-
zation, and communication. They successfully maintained parties.
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paramilitaries, youth wings, and media outlets. Groups as diverse as
HizboUah and the Democratic Unionists follow this pattern. Nazi and Fas-
cist parties took advantage of press laws, urbanization, and mass communi-
cation to agitate and attract followers. Likewise, Milosevic in Serbia and
the Hutu extremists in Rwanda established ultranationalist networks and
controlled important media outlets. Serbian media broadcast messages
intended to stir popular emotions and mobilize the people to peak anxiety
by recalling past mistreatment of the Serbs and intimating that Albanians,
Croats, and Bosnians again threatened them. So too. Radio Mille Collines,
the ultranationalist Hutu station, carried hate broadcasts that warned that
Tutsis planned to attack the Hutus and then called for death to Tutsis and
Hutu moderates, even providing the addresses of activists (Power 2002,
330-40).
Emotive content is another critical element in the communication of
hate. Both Hitler and Mussolini understood that effective propaganda
required an affective character. They employed extremist slogans and emo-
tional speeches. Contemporary groups continue to recognize the mobilizing
power of emotional language. Leaders realize it is critical to convince their
followers of the necessity of marginalizing, controlling, cleansing, or elimi-
nating other groups. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja emphasized this point dur-
ing an NPR interview. Ntalaja rejected the contention that ethnic hatred
was tribal or primordial and contended that leaders incited hatred, explain-
ing that
ethnic groups do have prejudices and people do tend to feel they may be
different from other groups. But it's not enough to make a person pick
up a knife or a gun and kill somebody else. It is when politicians come
and excite passion and try to threaten people-make people believe that
they are being threatened by other groups that are going to be extin-
guished. (Power 1994, 356)
Leaders realize they can motivate people through fear. The Hutu press
published the "Ten Commandments of the Hutu" which included, "The
Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi" and "His only aim is the
supremacy of his ethnic group" (African Rights 1995, 42-43). Milosevic
warned the Serbs that Albanians in Kosovo were arming and intended to
cleanse the region of Serbs so that Serbs must first act in defense. Leaders
also realize that their followers will be less likely to hesitate to act aggres-
sively if the enemy is dehumanized. As Hitler did, it is important to speak
of the enemy as deadly animals, as blood-suckers and parasites, or to link
the enemy to Satan. Ian Paisley continues to denounce the pope as the
Anti-Christ. Al-Zarqawi referred to Shi'a Muslims as "the insurmountable
obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying
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enemy, and the penetrating venom" (2004). Hutu leaders and Radio Mille
Collines called Tutsis devils and cockroaches. The Hamas media labels
Jews "dogs, rats, strangling octopi, pigs, monkeys, dragons, ghouls. Evil
Eyes and bug-eyed creatures to be crushed underfoot" (Oliver and Steinberg
1995, 8-9). Religious and political leaders address people at large rallies,
speaking with missionary zeal, demonizing the enemy, inciting the crowds,
and relying upon the appeal of fundamentalism (Marty and Appleby 1991,
822, 830). Contemporary groups employ Internet sites and satellite televi-
sion to reach audiences. Al-Zarqawi mastered communication with his
tapes of beheadings which he used both to attract supporters and intimidate
the enemy. He staged the beheadings complete with costumes and scripts
and even provided "previews" during which the victims were warned of the
upcoming events.
Myths and legends constitute another powerful tool in the communica-
tion of hate. Milosevic retold ancient myths of Serbia's founding after
defeat in Kosovo. He stirred popular sensitivities by recalling histories of
Ottoman and Croat mistreatment of Serb populations. While some truth
existed in these histories, Milosevic emphasized the Serbian vulnerability
and ignored the decades of peace that existed. Milosevic also encouraged
the military and para-militaries to engage in torture and ethnic cleansing
against non-Serb populations. Not only were the Albanians, Bosnians, and
Croats identified as threats to the Serbs, but they also occupied important
living space for the Serbs (Denich 1994, 371-72). Northern Ireland's Dem-
ocratic Unionists also possess their myths. The legendary bloody hand
thrown on shore to claim the territory of Ireland now becomes the name-
sake for the Red Hand Commandos, a group of Protestant paramilitaries.
Unionists annually recall the 1690 Victory at the Battle of the Boyne, a
heroic, triumphalist story of conquest intended to swell nationalistic pride
and courage. Hutu refugees too assert an ancient claim to land. They tell
the story of Burundi, a Hutu, who settled the country a century before
Christ. Later, the Tutsis polluted Hutu civilization and stole their home-
land. Hutu refugees also frequently recount Tutsi torture techniques,
intending to prove the inherent evil of the Tutsis (Malkki 1990, 39-42).
Likewise, Ashura, the Shia Islam holy day, marks the martyrdom of Hus-
sein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammad. Hussein's 680 defeat and
beheading by the caliphate in Karbala is the storied single event used to
solidify the division between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Shiite Muslims
contend that Hussein tried to stop the perversion of Islam, and his fight and
martyrdom exemplify the violent struggles and sacrifices required of fol-
lowers of Shia Islam (Sachedina 1991, 430-35). Shiite Mushms commemo-
rate the pain and sacrifice with chest-pounding and bloodletting. In recent
years Sunni Muslims have responded to the Shiite reenactment of the mar-
52 JOURNAL OF HATE STUDIES [Vol. 5:37
tyrdom by reenacting their victory. Violence between Sunni and Shiite
Muslims often ensues. In Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, Sunni suicide
bombers have attacked Shiite mourners on Ashura.
Symbols and colors also communicate the politics of hate. Symbols
often represent a code, well known to the initiated. They hold a visual
appeal that complements the spoken word. The Nazi swastika continues to
serve as a widely recognized symbol that ignites strong sentiments.
Throughout the Basque region red flowers, shutters, and doors affirm the
distinctiveness of the people and their commitment to the nation. In North-
ern Ireland, painted curbstones and lampposts claim territory, while murals
justify both the republican and unionist causes and remember those who
died fighting for their truth. The significance of certain dates, such as 1690
and 1916, is understood without explanation. Serbian flags decorate the
Republik Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina. SDS graffiti dots the
landscape and vows allegiance to the Serb Democratic Party of indicted war
criminals Karadzic and Mladic.
Nationalist and fundamentalist groups also often provide members
with uniforms to reinforce the unified identity of the group and the loyalty
of the individual. PLO members wear the keffiyeh popularized by Arafat.
Suicide bombers wear black military uniforms in their death photos. Amer-
ican white power, Christian Identity, and neo-Nazi websites offer online
purchases of an array of t-shirts and accessories. Even mousepads are
available. The Aryan Wear Killer Style site sells white power shirts; one
carries the slogan, "Try Zyklon B-It's a Gas" (2005). Their store also car-
ries children's clothing including Aryan Girls Academy and Happy Hitler
Girly tees. The store accepts dollars and euros.
Film, music and art can serve as effective propaganda tools. American
and European neo-Nazis and skinheads possess a rich set of music that
repeats violent white power slogans. The late William Pierce owned the
popular Resistance Records label. Lyrics such as "The March of Death has
come to reign hatred on the weak," and "Kill all the niggers and you gas all
the jews. Kill a gypsy and a coloured too" are typical of this music, which
attracts a growing following (Anti-Defamation League 2000). Television
and the internet provide fast and convenient media for reaching an audi-
ence. The growing technological sophistication available to nationalist and
fundamentalist groups could bolster their reach in the politics of the twenty-
first century. Al Qaeda produced a video of martyrs' funerals for recruit-
ment purposes. At the extreme, al-Zarqawi's theatrical introduction and
broadcast of beheadings via the internet communicates the power of his
movement and the vengeful hate which propels his cause. The broadcast
delivers messages to his membership, potential supporters, and the enemy.
Elsewhere, parades, demonstrations, and public funerals rally national-
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ist support. Such events are critical because they bring people together and
place them in a social context in which their notions of truth, good and evil
are endorsed and corroborated. Excellent examples include Milosevic's use
of public gatherings, the marching season in Northern Ireland, and the
funerals for suicide bombers in Palestine and Lebanon. In 1989, the Serb
leadership staged a massive week-long remembrance of the Ottoman defeat
of the Serbs in Kosovo. The Serb Orthodox hierarchy and three hundred
priests led a series of memorial services for martyrs. On the final day of the
event, crowds chanted in response to Milosevic, "We love you, Slobodan,
because you hate the Muslims" (Sells 1996, 69). The Protestant Orange-
men marches commemorate their victory over the Catholics in 1690 with
loud parades through Catholic neighborhoods. Weeks of practice marches
and celebratory bonfires precede the parades. The annual event, coupled
with the Unionist slogan "No Surrender," highlights that the 1690 victory is
ongoing. Hizbollah not only stages elaborate public funerals for their dead,
but also maintains a museum of martyrs to honor those killed for the cause.
This museum, like the Unionist parades, while emotionally gripping,
greatly simplifies the reality of the political situation. Additionally, the
museum, similar to the memorial murals in Northern Ireland, publicly and
permanently commemorates and honors the martyrs. In an atmosphere
focused on the sacrifice of the valiant and the evil of the enemy, reconcilia-
tion is difficult. Groups continue to nurture hate by demonizing and dehu-
manizing their enemies. Countering the hate requires political innovation
and will.
VI. TEMPERING THE POLITICS OF HATE
Political alternatives and remedies do exist to abort or ameliorate the
politics of hate and its violent consequences. Policy-makers and conflict
mediators can learn from other cases. An instructive example is that of
Macedonia. Although Macedonia witnessed some ultranationalist and
ethno-religious tension, it did not experience the genocide and ethnic
cleansing which bloodied its neighbors in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
The Macedonian case is critical because the outcome also highlights the
reality that often it is easier to facilitate a compromise before a cycle of
retaliation begins. Elite cooperation between moderate representatives of
ethnic groups proved significant. Leaders decided to use the media to pro-
mote tolerance rather than hate. Additionally, the Macedonians requested a
preventive deployment of NATO troops to squelch any planned trouble and
contain the violence in Kosovo.
Indeed, outside influence, if the actor is perceived as neutral, can be
critical. In Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh, American diplomacy and aid at
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least contain the conflicts (Cavanaugh 2004). The promise of EU member-
ship serves as a powerful deterrent to nationalist conflicts throughout
Europe. The carrot of future economic benefits often bears more fruit than
economic sanctions. Consider that the EU successfully encouraged the Bal-
tic states to extend equality to their Russian minorities (Davison 2006). In
the case of Turkey, the prize of EU membership contains Islamic funda-
mentalism and presses a reassessment of the conditions of the Kurds. Crisis
situations require not only peacekeepers, but also assistance to develop
political, economic, and social infrastructures. Powersharing constitutions,
joint development projects, unbiased and integrated schools, a free media,
and independent civil society all can contribute to the withering away of
extremism. Bosnia and Northern Ireland place emphasis on an integrated
police force, while the Mozambique peace settlement focused upon an inte-
grated military. The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia deems as
essential the financing of an independent media and school courses on
"Culture of Religion" and "Democratization and Human Rights" (Davison
and Tesan 2006).
Ignatieff discusses the importance of promoting a culture of civic
nationalism rather than ethnic nationalism within heterogeneous societies.
Civic nationalism is inclusive, while ethnic nationalism is exclusive. The
myth of blood ties is the basis of ethnic nationalism. Acceptance of the
principles of rule of law and equality serve as the foundational myth for
civic nationalists (1996). Such a suggestion might sound Utopian to some
political analysts, but in fact the EU has achieved success in advancing the
concept of civic nationalism. The provision of individual and group rights
is a condition for EU accession. Eight states of Eastern Europe embraced
and met this condition in order to join the Union in 2004. In the Baltic
states, this required the extension of rights to the Russian minority despite
the history of Soviet control (Davison 2006).
Efforts to overcome ethnic and religious tensions must include guaran-
tees of tolerance for diversity. Autonomy or federation arrangements are
possible if conflicting groups live in separate regions. Spain seems inclined
to avoid further conflict by implementing such autonomy accords. Alterna-
tively, innovations from the Northern Ireland peace process might be appli-
cable elsewhere. Particularly intriguing is the notion that sovereignty can
be shared and that people can hold multiple citizenships. A Catholic now
can be Irish, British, and European. Ireland, the UK, and the EU each pos-
sess different competencies in the North (Gottlieb 1994). Another Good
Friday compromise intended to foster cooperation in Northern Ireland is the
d'Hondt mechanism. The mechanism creates power-sharing arangements
in the legislature, cabinet, and ministries. The Dayton Accords also include
the d'Hondt mechanism as a means to ensure that decisions are com-
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promises between the ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While this
does impede policy-making efficiency, it seems preferable to nationalistic
dictatorships or bloody conflict. As Zartman points out, a durable solution
demands that minorities be treated equitably and not condemned to
powerlessness or lower class status (Zartman 1998, 317-36, 327-28). Addi-
tionally if the subsidiarity principle is coupled with power-sharing then
many decisions will devolve to local governments and thereby balance cen-
tral government immobilism (Zartman 1998, 328).
The globalization of non-violent civil disobedience offers a legitimate
alternative to oppressed groups (Nassar 2005, 64-65; Appleby 2000, 128-
31). People power movements increasingly challenge both oppressive gov-
ernments and violent extremist alternatives. Peaceful demonstrations
forced regime changes in a wide variety of states during the past two
decades, including the Philippines, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Bolivia, and
Serbia. These social movements rely upon epistemic communities, transna-
tional rights groups and modern communication technologies to bolster
their cause.
Tempering the hate message of fundamentalists is more difficult than
tempering the message of nationalists because fundamentalists believe they
cannot compromise divine truth and authority. Consequently, efforts to
counter the fundamentalist's politics of hate should target the underlying
conditions which make clerical fascism attractive and powerful. Certainly
these conditions include oppression, insecurity, and unemployment. Gun-
identifies state repression and discrimination against ethnic and religious
minorities as a fundamental source of conflict. He demonstrates that when
states implement individual and group rights, the likelihood of differences
spiraUng to conflict declines substantially (Gurr 2000; Harff and Gurr
2004). In these cases, the state's commitment to justice and equality coun-
ters the claims of the extremists.
Messages of hate require financing. Broadcasts, videos, and demon-
strations cost money. Therefore, it is desirable to attempt to cut the finan-
cial sources and freeze the bank accounts of violent fundamentalist groups.
The seizure of the assets of Richard Butler and the Aryan Nations com-
pound significantly weakened the organization. Intelligence suggests that
the freeze on various bank accounts critically impedes Al Qaeda's ability to
finance other militant groups.
Another strategy is to criminalize hate speech and hate organizations.
Many states pursue this path. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the
High Representative quickly removes offending politicians from office.
Additionally, the Central Election Committee is empowered to terminate
the candidacy of any politician who uses the language of hate. Likewise,
Israel outlawed the far right Jewish fundamentalist Kahanists. The Israeli
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Security Service deems the Kahanists responsible for the assassination of
Rabin and the massacre at the Hebron Mosque. Yet criminalizing this
organization did not stop it, and may only seem to verify the group's claims
that the Arab presence encroaches upon Jewish culture and tradition. Fur-
ther, the recent uncovering of a Kahanist plot to blow up a Palestinian girls'
school suggests the ongoing strength of the organization. Criminalization
might backfire and lend credence to the heroic claims of extremist groups
(Frontline 2005).
Of course, the problem of militant Islamic fundamentalism seems par-
ticularly challenging. Yet Turkey, Bangladesh, and Indonesia offer models
of democracy for Muslim polities. The Muslim leadership of Bosnia and
Herzegovina rejected extremism even in the wake of the war. Recently, the
Bosniak electorate voted for a moderate President and the government
deported immigrants tied to militant organizations. The Pew report Views
of a Changing World 2003 also provides cause for hope. The study high-
lighted that many Muslims in the Middle East share Western values of free-
dom of speech and the press, equality, and democracy, but react with
hostility toward American foreign policy in the region. Additionally, the
Pew 2005 report showed that people in Jordan, Lebanon, and Indonesia
responded positively to American efforts to support democracy. Clearly,
there is not a monolithic Islamic world. Militant fundamentalism vies with
liberal and conservative Islamist organizations. Muslim societies have dif-
ficult and significant political, economic, and religious issues to address,
but change is not impossible. One option is to support "political arenas in
which Islamists are able to participate but also are constrained by the need
to compete with secular political parties, compelling them to moderate their
positions to maintain their popularity" (Barsalou 2005, 11).
Indeed, moderates within various religious traditions should be sup-
ported. Moderate Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and Christians exist, but pre-
cisely because they are moderate they often do not view political
participation as appropriate or salient. Nevertheless, broad-based participa-
tion must be encouraged, particularly in regions where religion is
politicized, so that extremists cannot seize the agenda (Appleby 2000). In
Sarajevo, the Franciscan Community has reached out to the population with
ecumenical events. Corrymeela in Northern Ireland offers another example
of religious actors advocating understanding and non-violence. Leadersliip
of non-partisan truth commissions, such as by Bishop Tutu in South Africa
and Bishop Gerardi in Guatemala, conveys and validates the alternative
religious message of reconciliation and peace.
The communication of hate, particularly such that massive and system-
atic violence is incited, ought to be intolerable to leaders committed to
equality and rights. Gurr notes that typically states seek to control discrimi-
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nation and tension. National interest drives most leaders to prefer to main-
tain a calm political climate attractive to economic growth (2000, 275-81).
When a state's leaders, however, mobilize a people to attack or cleanse
"enemies," "sinners," or "apostates," then an external response becomes
necessary. The problem is especially serious when a government rather
than an independent religious or nationalist group perpetrates the hate.
Governments provide security and therefore hold a monopoly on force.
When a state discriminates against a group within its borders, the govern-
ment typically possesses the military and police power to eliminate the
group. Not only does the group despair about its situation, but it becomes
likely that some members of the oppressed group will attempt to organize a
military response. Yet many people will be caught between sides in the
conflict. Often they find themselves in the middle in both a political and a
physical sense.
In the last two decades, the United Nations developed criteria for
humanitarian intervention (Harff and Gurr 2004, 170-80). When domestic
efforts to avert or control the politics of hate fail, such that these politics
produce extreme outcomes of genocide or ethnic cleansing, then global
leaders possess legal and legitimate bases to respond (Hehir 2004, 25-26).
Ignoring human suffering produced by the politics of hate is a form of apa-
thy upon which extremist leaders depend. Each failure to respond embold-
ens other extremist leaders. The leaders of extremist groups gamble on the
failure of political will by their democratic national and international coun-
terparts. Global inaction implies acceptance of the extremist "truths" that
ethno-religious identity matters, that the lives of some national and religious
groups are worth more than the lives of others, and that violence is permis-
sible to advance the cause. Yet the violence is neither tribal nor inevitable.
Gurr, Zartman, Ignatieff, and Appleby offer solutions and identify cases in
which leadership and political action averted bloody extremist conflict. The
knowledge and tools do exist to contain the violent outcomes of the politics
of hate. Ultimately, the challenge is one of political innovation and will at
both the state and global levels.
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